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We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner 
has no knowledge about the detail of model specifications, and only a few individuals 
participate in the mechanism. In contrast with the standard model of implementation, each 
agent has non-consequential moral preference in that she prefers truth-telling to lying 
whenever the resulting consequence is unchanged. We show that with complete 
information, there exists a single, detail-free mechanism that can implement any social 
choice function whenever agents regard its value as being socially desirable. This result 
holds even if psychological cost for lying is close to zero. Non-consequential moral 
preferences play a very powerful role in eliminating unwanted equilibria in detail-free 
mechanism design with representative systems. We extend this result to incomplete 
information. 
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This paper demonstrates a new approach to the implementation problem, where a 
social choice function, which is defined as a mapping from states to consequences, is said 
to be implementable in any equilibrium concept such as Nash equilibrium and iterative 
dominance, if the central planner (the constitution designer, or the auctioneer) can design a 
mechanism, in which at every state, there exists the unique equilibrium outcome, and this 
outcome equals the associated value of the social choice function. This paper will assume 
that the central planner has no knowledge about the detail of model specifications such as 
the set of states, the utility functions, and the social choice function. Hence, the central 
planner can only design mechanisms that are detail-free, i.e., are independent of this detail. 
This paper will also assume that the central planner is faced with restrictions of 
representative systems, where she can invite only a few individuals in the society to 
participate in the mechanism as agents. 
This paper will allow agents to have, not only preferences for consequences, but also 
non-consequential moral preferences. This implies that each agent’s welfare depends, not 
only on the consequence of the central planner’s choice, but also on whether she tells the 
truth or lies in the process of public decision. This point is in sharp contrast with the 
standard model of implementation where each agent has preference only for consequences, 
i.e., each agent’s welfare at any state depends only on the central planner’s choice of 
alternative and monetary transfer to her. For surveys on the implementation literature, see 
Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), and Maskin and 
Sjöström (2002), for instance.
1 This paper will then show a very permissive result that the 
central planner can design a single mechanism that is detail-free but is almighty in the 
sense that, irrespective of how the set of states to be specified, it can implement any social 
choice function as long as agents regard its value as being socially desirable at any state. 
This result holds even if agents’ moral preferences are very weak relatively to their 
preferences for consequences. 
The mechanisms designed and used in the implementation literature have depended on the 
very detail of model specifications. In real situations, however, the central planner may not be 
informed of this detail in advance. Even if she could know this detail, it may be impossible to 
describe it on a document because of its complexity. This is the reason why the previous studies 
of implementation were not much successful as a practical theory, even if there are many 
important contributions on its own right. In order to put implementation theory into practice, it is 
inevitable to restrict our attentions only to detail-free mechanism design. As the experts in this 
literature have known, however, in the standard model, it is impossible for the central planner to 
design a mechanism that is detail-free but can implement multiple social choice functions in 
Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
1 There are a few exceptions. For example, Eliaz (2002) took into account factors other than individuals’ 
preferences for consequences such as bounded rationality. Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) allowed agents 
to have non-consequential preferences.   3
In real situations, it may be costly for the central planner to invite all individuals in the 
society to participate in the mechanism. Hence, it is quite important to investigate 
implementation with restrictions of representative systems where only a few individuals are 
allowed to participate in the mechanism as agents. The previous works on implementation, 
however, have never investigated such representative systems, and instead have implicitly 
assumed that any individual participates in the mechanism whenever her preference 
influences the value of the social choice function. In the standard model, this assumption is 
even necessary for showing any possibility result. In fact, we can easily check that it is 
mostly impossible to implement any social choice function whenever there is an individual 
who does not participate in the mechanism but whose preference influences the value of 
this social choice function. 
From these observations, we must conclude that as long as we stick to the standard 
model of implementation, no devices of mechanism design work in practical situations with 
limited knowledge of the central planner and with representative systems. Based on this, 
the main departure of this paper from the previous works is to give up the standard model 
and to investigate an alternative model where each agent has, not only preference for 
consequences, but also non-consequential preference. Here, each agent treats the same 
consequence of the central planner’s choice differently, depending on the process that leads 
up to it. In particular, she strictly prefers truth-telling to lying whenever the resulting 
outcome is unchanged between truth-telling and lying. Whether she tells the truth or lies 
has its own intrinsic value for her welfare. 
Surely, this non-consequentialist view is inconsistent with the neo-classical framework 
of “homo economicus”, who cares only about the consequence in a purely selfish way.
2 
This view, on the other hand, is very consistent with empirical and experimental evidences. 
For instance, the recent work by Gneezy (2002) did very important experimental researches, 
showing that most subjects in the laboratory prefer truth-telling to lying when whether 
lying or not does not much influences the consequence. For any real human being, decision 
to lie is more or less a matter of weighting costs and benefits. 
This paper will show a new idea of mechanism design that describes the following 
decision procedure. The central planner will invite just three individuals as agents 1, 2, and 
3, respectively. She will ask each agent to make multiple announcements about which 
alternative to be socially desirable. The number of their multiple announcements is set to be 
sufficiently large. The central planner will then pick up one announcement profile at 
random among all profiles except the first profile. If two or three agents recommend the 
same alternative, she will choose it. Otherwise, she will choose the status quo. She will fine 
any agent a small monetary amount whenever this agent is either agent 2 or agent 3 and is 
the first deviant from agent 1’s first announcement. Clearly, this mechanism is detail-free. 
This mechanism is also consistent with representative systems, because we need just three 
individuals to participate in it.  
                                                 
2 Preference for consequence does not necessarily imply pure self-interest. In fact, most models of social 
preferences falls under the category of preference for consequence. See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for 
instance.   4
We consider the complete information environments, where which alternative to be 
socially desirable is common knowledge among agents. Each agent’s preference is defined 
as a combination of preference for consequences and non-consequential moral preference. 
Here, each agent has positive psychological cost for lying, i.e., for not announcing the 
socially desirable alternative honestly. We assume that the more the number of dishonest 
announcements she makes, the more psychological cost she has. The total psychological 
cost can be close to zero even if all announcements by her are dishonest. In other word, the 
present paper will simply exclude the case that agents have preferences only for 
consequences as the standard model has assumed. 
The introduction of non-consequential moral preferences in this way plays a very 
powerful role as follows. Irrespective of how the set of states to be specified, any social 
choice function can be implemented in iterative dominance (and therefore, in Nash 
equilibrium) by the single, detail-free mechanism with just three agents, whenever at any 
state these agents regard the associated value of this social choice function as being socially 
desirable. Agents’ non-consequential moral preferences can be very week relatively to their 
preferences for consequences. Hence, we can say that implementation never works in the 
consequentialist model, whereas the best possibility result for implementation holds in our 
non-consequentialist model. 
Even if we permit the central planner to have enough knowledge about the detail of 
model specifications, and we also permit all relevant individuals to participate in the 
mechanism, i.e., even if we do not take restrictions of detail-free mechanism design and 
representative systems into account, our model has the following great advantage over the 
standard model. It is clear from the very definition of implementability that distinct states 
must correspond to the same value of the social choice function if these correspond to the 
same preference profile of agents. For related arguments, see Maskin and Tirole (1999) and 
Tirole (1999). This implies that in the standard model, any implementable social choice 
function must depend only on agents’ preferences for consequences. This, however, will 
very severely restrict the range of implementable social choice functions. As many 
important attempts to establish foundations of social choice and welfare such as Rawls 
(1971), Dworkin (1981), and Sen (1982, 1985, 1999) has emphasized, several ethical 
factors of the state are crucial to determine which social choice function to be right, and 
these factors should be sharply distinct from agents’ preferences for consequences.
3 Even if 
the central planner could know these factors in advance, the relevance of them to social 
welfare may be too complicated to describe on a document. Hence, we must conclude that 
in the standard model, no ethically right social choice function is implementable. In 
contrast, in our model, whenever distinct states correspond to distinct values of the social 
choice function that agents regard as being socially desirable, then these states always 
correspond to distinct non-consequential moral preferences for each agent. This will be the 
driving force of implementing any ethically right social choice function in our model.
4 
                                                 
3 Rawls introduced primary goods. Dworkin introduced compensation and responsibility. Sen introduced 
liberty, functioning, and capabilities. These are concepts categorized into non-consequentialism. See Basu, 
Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1995), Sen (1999), and Suzumura (2002). 
4  The disadvantages possessed by the standard model matter irrespective of implementation being   5
In the latter part of this paper, we will extend the above arguments to the incomplete 
information environments. Each agent receives her private signal in advance, including 
only partial information about which alternative to be socially desirable. A state is defined 
as a profile of agents’ private signals, and an alternative is defined as a bundle of 
characteristics. Each characteristic of the socially optimal alternative is known to an agent 
in advance through her private signal. 
The central planner will ask each agent to make multiple announcements about what 
she knows about the socially desirable alternative. Each agent has non-consequential moral 
preference in that she has positive psychological cost for not honestly announcing the 
characteristic of the socially desirable alternative that she knows. Their costs can be as 
close to zero as possible. 
Even with incomplete information, we can show a very permissive result that there 
exists a single mechanism that can implements any social choice function in iterative 
dominance if this social choice function satisfies (a variant of) incentive compatibility. This 
mechanism is independent of the set of states, the probability function on the set of states, 
agents’ state-contingent preferences for consequences, and even the social choice function. 
We would like to emphasize that the main role of non-consequential moral preferences 
in this paper is not to weaken the restriction of incentive compatibility but to eliminate 
unwanted equilibria. Even if agents’ psychological costs are close to zero, their non-
consequential moral preferences play this role perfectly.
5  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 shows the basic model. Section 
3 considers the complete information environments. Subsection 3.1 defines implementation 
in iterative dominance. Subsection 3.2 specifies agents’ utility forms. Subsection 3.3 
designs a detail-free mechanism. Subsection 3.4 shows and proves the first main theorem of 
this paper. Subsection 3.5 discusses the implications of this theorem, where we will argue 
that the use of small fines is particularly important in representative systems, and without 
fines, even the canonical mechanisms do not work. We will also argue that the central 
planner does not even need to know the set of possible alternatives. 
Section 4 considers the incomplete information environments. Subsection 4.1 defines 
implementation in iterative dominance in the Bayesian framework. Subsection 4.2 specifies 
utility forms. Subsection 4.3 designs a detail-free mechanism. Subsection 4.4 shows and 
proves the second main theorem. Subsection 4.4.5 generalizes this theorem by allowing the 
central planner to know the set of states and the social choice function in advance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
‘virtual’ or ‘exact’. See Subsection 3.5.4. 
5 Several works such as Erard and Feinstein (1994), Alger and Ma (2003), and Deneckere and 
Severinov (2001) examined the case including agents who have non-consequential preference for 
honesty. These works assumed that their costs for lying are very large.   6
2. Basic Model 
 
 
Let  } ,..., 1 { n N =   denote the set of agents who participate in the public decision 
procedure as being representative of all individuals in the society, where  2 ≥ n . We must 
note that N   may be a proper subset of the set of individuals in the society who are 
influenced by the central planner’s decision. 
Let  A denote the set of alternatives. Let ∆ denote the set of simple lotteries over 




i M M  
denote the set of message profiles. Let  i i M m ∈  and  M m m N i i ∈ = ∈ ) (.  
Fix a positive real number  0 > ε  arbitrarily, which can be close to zero. We regard ε  
as the upper bound of monetary fines. Given the set of message profiles M , a mechanism 
is defined by 
) , ( t x G = , 
where 
∆ → M x:,  
N i i t t ∈ = ) (,  
) , [ : ∞ − → ε M ti , 
and t satisfies the budgetary constraint in the sense that 
0 ) ( ≤ ∑
∈N i
i m t  for all  M m∈ . 
The central planner will ask each agent  N i∈  to announce a message  i i M m ∈ . When 
agents announce  M m∈ , the central planner will choose an alternative according to the 
simple lottery  ∆ ∈ ) (m x , and she will make a monetary transfer  ) , [ ) ( ∞ − ∈ ε m ti  to each 
agent  N i∈ . 
   7
3. Complete Information 
 
 
This section investigates the following complete information environments. We 
assume  3 = n , i.e., 
} 3 , 2 , 1 { = N . 
We must note that there may be other individuals in the society who do not participate in 
the decision procedure but are influenced by the central planner’s decision. This section 
will show that only three participants are enough for the central planner to implement any 
alternative as long as these participants regard it as being socially desirable. This implies 
that implementation works even under severe restrictions of representative systems. 
Let  A a ∈
*  denote  the  socially desirable alternative. The fact that 
* a  is  socially 
desirable is common knowledge among agents, whereas the central planner does not know 
which alternative to be socially desirable. 
A utility function for each agent  N i∈  is defined by 
R M R A u i i → × × :,  
where  ) , , ( i i i m t a u  denote  agent  s i'   utility when she announces message  i i M m ∈ , the 
central planner chooses alternative  A a∈ , and the central planner makes monetary transfer 
R ti ∈  to agent i. We will allow each agent’s announcement to have intrinsic value for her 
welfare, which implies that each agent may have non-consequential preference as well 
preference for consequences. 
We assume the expected utility hypothesis. Let  N i i u u ∈ = ) (  denote a utility function 
profile. The utility function profile u  is common knowledge among the agents, whereas the 
central planner does not know it. 
 
 
3.1. Implementation in Iterative Dominance 
 
 
A combination  ) , ( u G  defines a game. The solution concept used in this section is 
iterative dominance, where the agents announce any message profile that survives after 
iterative eliminations of undominated messages. 
Let  i i M M =





) 0 ( ) 0 ( . Recursively, for every  ,... 2 , 1 = r , let 
) (r
i M  denote 
the set of messages 
) 1 ( − ∈
r











i M M   in the sense that there exists no  i i M m ∈ ′   such that for every 
) 1 ( −
− − ∈
r
i i M m , 













) ( ) (
r
r M M . A message profile  M m∈  is said to be iteratively 
undominated in the game  ) , ( u G  if 
) (∞ ∈M m . 
The socially desirable alternative  A a ∈
*   is said to be implemented in iterative 
dominance in the game  ) , ( u G  if there exists the unique iteratively undominated message 
profile m , and this profile satisfies that 
   
* ) ( a m x = , 
and 
0 ) ( = m xi  for all  N i∈ . 
We must note that whenever 
* a  is implemented in iterative dominance in  ) , ( u G , then it is 






This section assumes that there exists a positive integer  0 > K  such that 
  
K
i A M =  for all  N i∈ , 
where  K   is sufficiently large. The central planner will ask each agent to make K  
announcements at once about which alternative to be socially desirable. Let 
K i i i M M M , 1 , × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × =  
where 
A M k i = , . 
Let  i i M m ∈
*  denote the honest message for agent i such that 
* *
, a m k i =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , 
where agent i   K   times honestly announces the socially desirable alternative. Let 
M m m N i i ∈ = ∈ ) (
* *  denote the honest message profile. 
Fix a positive real number  0 > d  arbitrarily, which is sufficiently large. We regard d  
as the upper bound of each agent’s utility differences for consequences, as we will explain 
below. We assume that each agent  s i'  utility function  i u  satisfies that there exist a function 
R A vi → :  and a positive real number  0 > i c  such that 
(1)     i
k i
i i i i i c
K
a m K k
t a v m t a u
} : } ,..., 1 { { #
) ( ) , , (
*
, ≠ ∈
− + = , 
and 
(2)     d a v a v i i
N A i a a
≤ ′ −
× ∈ ′
) ( ) ( max
2 ) , , (
.   9
We regard  i c  as the upper bound of agent  s i'  psychological cost for not announcing 
the socially desirable alternative honestly. Each agent’s non-consequential moral preference 
is described by the psychological cost for not announcing the socially desirable alternative 








and is increasing with respect to the number of agent  s i'  dishonest  announcements 
} : } ,..., 1 { { #
*
, a m K k k i ≠ ∈ . 
The function  i v  represents  agent  s i'   preference for consequences. Inequalities (2) 
imply that d   is an upper bound of agents’ utility differences for consequences. From 
equalities (1), it follows that each agent’s preference is defined as a combination of 
preference for consequences and non-consequential moral preferences. 
The standard model of implementation assumes that  i c  equals zero for all  N i∈ , i.e., 
each agent has only preference for consequences. In contrast, our model in this section 
assumes that for every  N i∈ ,  i c  must be positive but can be as close to zero as possible. 
We assume that the number of announcements K  is large enough to satisfy 
(3)     d K > − ε ) 1 (.  
This implies that the mechanism may depend on the upper bound d  of utility differences 
for consequences. This section, however, designs mechanisms that never depend on any 
more details of model specifications. 
 
 
3.3. Mechanism Design 
 
 
Fix an alternative  A a ∈  arbitrarily, which is regarded as the status quo. We design a 
mechanism ) , (
* * * t x G =  as follows. 
For every  M m∈  and every  } /{a A a∈ , let 
1







agents three or two for a m K k
a m x
k i , 
and 




a m x a m x ) )( ( 1 ) )( (
* * , 
where 
} 0 ) )( ( : } /{ {
* > ∈ = Γ a m x a A a , 
i.e.,  } {a U Γ   is the support of 





central planner will pick up the  th k −  announcement profile  ) , , ( , 3 , 2 , 1 k k k m m m , and she will   10
then choose any alternative  A a∈   if at least two agents announce it as their  th k −  
announcements, i.e., 
a m k i = ,  for at least two agents. 
If there exists no such alternative, the central planner will choose the status quo a . Note 
that  ) ( * m x  does not depend on agents’ first announcements  ) , , ( 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 m m m . 
For every  M m∈ , let 
    0 ) (
*
1 = m t . 
Hence, agent 1 is never fined. For every  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i  and every  M m∈ , let 
ε − = ) (
* m ti  if there exist  } ,..., 2 { K k ∈  such that  1 , 1 , m m k i ≠ , and 
1 , 1 , 3 , 2 m m m h h = =  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h . 
and 
0 ) (
* = m ti  if there exists no such k . 
Hence, each agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i  is fined if and only if she is the first agent between agents 2 and 




3.4. Possibility Theorem 
 
 
  W e  w i l l  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  
* G  implements  any alternative in iterative 
dominance, as long as agents regard it as being socially desirable. 
 
Theorem 1:  The socially desirable alternative  A a ∈
*   is implemented in iterative 
dominance in  ) , (
* u G.  
 
Proof: Whenever agents announce the honest message profile 
* m , then the central planner 
will chooses the socially desirable alternative 
* a , and no agents will be fined, i.e., 
   
* * * ) ( a m x = , 
and 
0 ) (
* * = m ti  for all  N i∈ . 
Hence, all we have to do in this proof is to show that the honest message profile 
* m  is the 
unique iteratively undominated message profile. 
Note that each agent  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i  has incentive to announce 
*
1 , a mi = , 
                                                 
6 We must note that agents 2 and 3’s first announcements  ) , ( 1 , 3 1 , 2 m m  are redundant, and therefore, we 
can simply delete them with a minor change of our mechanism design.   11
because both  ) (
* m x  and  ) (
* m ti  are independent of  1 , i m , and because of moral preference. 
Fix  } ,..., 2 { K h∈  and  M m∈   arbitrarily, where we assume that all agents honestly 
announce from their first announcements to their  th h − − ) 1 (  announcements, i.e., 
*
, a m h i = ′  for all  N i∈  and all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ ′ h h . 
First, consider any agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . Suppose 
*
, a m h i ≠ . 
Let  i i M m ∈ ′  be the message for agent i defined by 
*
, a m h i = ′ , 
and 
h i h i m m ′ ′ = ′ , ,  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . 
Hence,  i m′ is the same as  i m  except  th h −  announcement, and the  th h −  announcement of 
i m′ is honest. If 
*
, a m h j =  for all  } /{i N j∈ , 
then ) (
* m x  is independent of  h i m , , and  0 ) ( ) , (
* * ≥ − ′ − m t m m t i i i i , which implies that agent i 
has incentive to announce  i m′ instead of  i m  because of her moral preferecne. If 
*
, a m h j ≠  for some  i j ≠ , 
then it follows 
ε = − ′ − ) ( ) , (
* * m t m m t i i i i , 
which, together with inequalities (2) and (3), implies that agent i has incentive to announce 
i m′ instead of  i m , because 
) ), , ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), ( (
* * * *
i i i i i i i i i i m m m t m m x u m m t m x u ′ ′ ′ − − −  




Next, Consider agent 1. Suppose 
*
, a m h i =  for each  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i , 
and 
*
, 1 a m h ≠ . 
Let  1 1 M m ∈ ′  be the message for agent 1 defined by 
*
, 1 a m h = ′ , 
and 
h h m m ′ ′ = ′ , 1 , 1  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . 
Note that  ) (




1 = = ′ − m t m m t , which implies that 
agent 1 has incentive to announce  1 m′ instead of  1 m , because of moral preference.   12
The above arguments imply that the honest message profile 
* m  is  the  unique 
iteratively undominated message profile in  ) , (
* u G . Hence, we have proved that the socially 
desirable alternative  A a ∈
*  is implemented in iterative dominance in  ) , (







3.5.1. Implementation of Social Choice Functions 
 
 
  The introduction of non-consequential moral preferences to the model plays the 
following striking role in implementing social choice functions. Fix a set of states Ω 
arbitrarily, and we define a social choice function as a mapping from states to alternatives, 
i.e., 
A f → Ω : . 
We assume that each agent’s preference for consequences is contingent on the state, and 
therefore, we denote 
) (ω i i v v = ,  ) (ω i i u u = , and  ) (ω u u = . 
Given an arbitrary set of message profile M , a social choice function f  is said to be 
implementable in Nash equilibrium (iterative dominance) if there exists a mechanism G  
such that at any state  Ω ∈ ω   the value of the social choice function  A f ∈ ) (ω  is 
implemented in Nash equilibrium (iterative dominance) in the game  )) ( , ( ω u G , i.e., there 
exists a Nash equilibrium (an iteratively undominated message profile) in  )) ( , ( ω u G , and 
any Nash equilibrium (any iteratively undominated message profile) in  )) ( , ( ω u G  induces 
) (ω f  with no fines realized. From Theorem 1, it follows that irrespective of how the set of 
state to be specified, any social choice function  f  is implementable in iterative dominance 
whenever at any state  Ω ∈ ω  agents regard  ) (ω f  as being socially desirable. 
It is clear from the above definition of implementability that if distinct states ω  and 
ω ω ≠ ′   correspond to distinct values  ) (ω f  and  ) ( ) ( ω ω f f ≠ ′ , then these states must 
correspond to distinct preference profiles, i.e., there exist no real numbers ρ  and λ  such 
that 
0 > ρ  and  λ ω ρ ω + ′ = ) ( ) ( u u . 
Note that if there exist such ρ  and λ , then the set of Nash equilibria in  )) ( , ( ω u G  equals 
the set of Nash equilibria in  )) ( , ( ω′ u G . Hence, implementability in Nash equilibrium 
implies  ) ( ) ( ω ω f f = ′ , which is a contradiction.   13
Since 0 > i c  for all  N i∈ , i.e., agents have non-consequential moral preferences, it 
follows that whenever distinct states correspond to distinct values, i.e., distinct socially 
desirable alternatives, then these states always correspond to distinct non-consequential 
moral preference for each agent. This point is in contrast with the standard model of 
implementation. The standard model assumes that  0 = i c  for all  N i∈ , i.e., agents have 
preferences only for consequences, which implies that if distinct states correspond to 
distinct values, then these states must correspond to distinct preference profiles for 
consequences. This will prevent a very wide variety of important social choice functions 
from being implementable in Nash equilibrium. For instance, as we have mentioned in the 
introduction, several authors such as Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen have emphasized that non-
consequential factors of the state other than agents’ preferences for consequences are very 
substantial in foundations of social choice and welfare. Hence, ethically important social 
choice functions are not implementable in the standard model, whereas these are all 
implementable in our model. 
There is an important class of social choice functions that are non-ethical but not 
implementable in the standard model. For instance, Serrano and Vohra (2001) investigated 
the economic environments where agents’ preferences are the same across states but their 
initial endowments depend on the state. They showed that no individually rational social 
choice function is implementable.  Theorem 1 implies that any social choice function in 
this class is implementable in our model. 
 
 
3.5.2. Detail-Free Mechanism Design 
 
 
 The  mechanism 
* G  can be regarded as being detail-free in the sense that it does not 
depend on the detail of model specifications. In fact, it is independent of the set of states Ω, 
state-contingent preferences for consequence  N i i v ∈ ⋅)) ( ( , and the size of agents’ 
psychological costs  N i i c ∈ ) ( . Most of the mechanisms that have been designed in the 
implementation literature were not detail-free at all. On the other hand, some trading 
mechanisms in real situations such as auction formats may be detail- free. 
The mechanism 
* G  does not depend on even the social choice function  f . Theorem 1 
implies that such a single mechanism as 
* G  can implement any social choice function  f , 
as long as at any state  Ω ∈ ω  agents regard its associated value  ) (ω f  as being socially 
desirable, i.e.,  ) (
* ω f a = . This point is in contrast with the standard model of 
implementation where agents have preferences only for consequences. It is clear from 
Subsection 3.5.1 that given any set of states Ω and any state-contingent preference profile 
for consequences  N i i v ∈ ⋅)) ( ( , there exists no single mechanism that can implement two 
distinct social choice functions in Nash equilibrium. This is the reason why in the standard 
model, a mechanism must be well tailored to the detail of a particular specification of social   14
choice function. On the other hand, when agents have non-consequential moral preferences, 
their state-contingent preferences inevitably depend on how the social choice function  f  to 
be specified, because at any state  Ω ∈ ω , each agent sustains positive psychological cost if 
and only if she announces other alternatives than  ) (
* ω f a = . This dependence will be the 




3.5.3. Representative Systems 
 
 
  Theorem 1 implies that whenever agents have non-consequential moral preferences, 
then implementation works very well even in representative systems where only a few 
individuals in the society are allowed to participate in the mechanism. In fact, this section 
needs just three individuals to participate in the mechanism. 
This point is in contrast with the standard model where all individuals in the society 
have preferences only for consequences. In the standard model, in order to implement any 
social choice function, the central planner must invite all individuals whose preferences 
influence its value to participate in the decision procedure. As long as there is no proper 
subset of individuals whose preferences for consequences are sufficient statistics for 
necessary information about the other individuals’ preferences for consequences, it is 
impossible for the central planner to implement any social choice function under 
restrictions of representative systems. On the other hand, agents’ non-consequential moral 
preferences can be a sufficient statistic for the socially desirable alternative, which will be 
the driving force for making implementation compatible with restrictions of representative 
systems in our model. 
 
 
3.5.4. Pareto Property and Small Fines 
 
 
  Since the set of agents is a proper subset of all individuals in the society, it might be 
rather absurd to require a social choice function to satisfy Pareto Property or No Veto 
Power among these agents. Even if all agents prefer the same alternative the best, the other 
individuals who do not participate in the mechanism may dislike it. 
This point may make implementation difficult to solve by using canonical mechanisms 
in this literature such as modulo or integer mechanisms originated by Maskin (1999) and 
others. Most relevant authors have focused on social choice functions that satisfy No Veto 
Power. In fact, their arguments have crucially relied on No Veto Power. 
Based on this observation, Theorem 1 implies that the introduction of small fines will 
play an important role under restrictions of representative systems. In the proof of Theorem 
1, instead of the canonical mechanisms, we used a variant of mechanism design device   15
originated by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a), where each agent makes multiple 
announcements, and only the first deviants are fined a small monetary amount. 
Abreu and Matsushima showed that in the standard model with small fines, any non-
Paretian social choice function is virtually implementable in iterative dominance on the 
assumption that distinct states corresponding to distinct values of this social choice function 
correspond to distinct preference profiles. In contrast with Abreu and Matsushima, the 
present paper does not need this assumption, and our possibility theorem is not ‘virtual’ but 
‘exact’. In order to incentivize agents to announce honestly, the original Abreu and 
Matsushima mechanism needed to have a positive probability with which the central 
planner will choose ‘wrong’ alternatives on purpose. On the other hand, our mechanism, by 
using only agents’ small non-consequential moral preferences, succeeded to incentivize 
them not to lie at all without reducing the probability of right alternative choice. 
  We should be careful about the advantages that virtual implication has over exact 
implication. It is well known in the implementation literature that in the standard model, 
virtual implementation works much better than exact implementation, because exact 
implementation needs Monotonicity condition as being necessary, whereas virtual 
implementation does not.
 7  We must note, however, that even virtual implementation needs 
to be based on the assumptions that the social choice function depends only on agents’ 
preferences for consequences, that the mechanism can depend on the detail of model 
specifications, and that all relevant individuals participate in the mechanism as agents. 
Hence, our model has the great advantages over the standard model, irrespective of whether 
implementation being virtual or exact in the latter model. 
 
 
3.5.5. Non-Consequential Moral Preferences 
 
 
In Subsection 3.2, we have specified each agent  s i'  non-consequential  moral 
preferences by the psychological cost  i
k i c
K
a m K k } : } ,..., 1 { { #
*
, ≠ ∈
. The content of 
Theorem 1, however, does not much depend on this specification. For instance, replace 
equalities (1) with equalities for all  N i∈  such that 
i i i i i i i i c m q t a v m t a u ) ( ) ( ) , , ( − + = , 
where  R M q i i → :  satisfies that for every  i i M m ∈  and every  i i M m ∈ ′ , 
    ) ( ) ( i i i i m q m q ′ >  if there exists  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  such that  k i k i m a m ,
*
, ≠ = ′ , and 
h i h i m m , , = ′  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { k K h∈ . 
This implies that the more the number of agent  s i'  honest announcements is, the less her 
psychological cost is. We can easily check that Theorem 1 holds even if we consider more 
general forms of non-consequential moral preferences like this. 
                                                 
7 See Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991).   16
 
 
3.5.6. Set of Alternatives 
 
 
This section showed that even if the central planner has no knowledge about the model 
specifications such as the set of states, agents’ preferences for consequences, and the social 
choice function, she can design well-behaved mechanisms such as 
* G . We do not even 
require the central planner to know the set of alternatives  A   in advance. In fact, the 
mechanism 
* G  can be simply described by the following document written by the central 
planner. 
 
“Tell me K  times on what I should do for your society. I 
will pick up one announcement profile from the last  1 − K  
profiles. If at least two of you recommend me to do the 
same thing, then I will do it. Otherwise, I will do nothing. I 
will fine you a small monetary amount ε  if and only if you 
are either agent 2 or agent 3 and are the first deviant from 
agent 1’s first announcement.” 
 
Clearly, this document does not say anything about the set of alternatives. This, however, 
can perform the same work as the mechanism 
* G  defined in Subsection 3.3. 
   17
4. Incomplete Information 
 
 
This section investigates the following incomplete information environments. Before 
announcing a message, each agent receives her private signal denoted by  i ω . Let  i Ω  





i   denote the set of states. Let  ] 1 , 0 [ : → Ψ p   denote a probability measure on 
) , ( Ψ Ω , according to which the state is randomly determined, where Ψ  is a  − σ field. Let 
P  denote the set of probability measures. 
A social choice function  A f → Ω :  is defined as a mapping from states to alternatives. 
At any state  Ω ∈ ω , the agents regard  ) (ω f   as the socially desirable alternative. The 
central planner never knows not only which alternative to be socially desirable at the 
current state but also what the social choice function is. 
We redefine a utility function for each agent  N i∈  by replacing  R M R A u i i → × × :  in 
Section 3 with 
R M R A u i i → Ω × × × :.  
We allow interdependent values in that each agent’s utility can depend on the other agents’ 
private signals. We assume the expected utility hypothesis. Let  N i i u u ∈ = ) (  denote a utility 
function profile. The utility function profile u  is common knowledge among the agents, 
whereas the central planner does not know it. 
 
 
4.1. Implementation in Iterative Dominance 
 
 
A combination  ) , , , , ( u p G Ψ Ω  defines a Bayesian game. A strategy for each agent 
N i∈  is defined as a function 
i i i M s → Ω :.  
Let  i S   denote the set of all strategies for agent i . We denote by  N i i s s ∈ = ) (  a  strategy 




i S S ,  N i i i s s ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω ω , and  } /{ )) ( ( ) ( i N j j j i i s s ∈ − − = ω ω . 
The solution concept used in this section is the Bayesian version of iterative 
dominance, which defined as follows. Let  i i S S =





) 0 ( ) 0 ( . Recursively, for 
every  ,... 2 , 1 = r , let 
) (r
i S   denote the set of strategies 
) 1 ( − ∈
r
i i S s   for each agent i  that  are 










i S S   in that there exist no  i i M m ∈  and  no 




i i S s ,   18
] | ) ), ( )), ( ( )), ( ( ( [ i i i i s s t s x u E ω ω ω ω ω  
] | ) , )), ( , ( )), ( , ( ( [ i i i i i i i i i i m s m t s m x u E ω ω ω ω − − − − < , 













) ( ) (
r
r S S . A strategy profile  S s∈   is said to be iteratively 
undominated in the Bayesian game  ) , , , , ( u p G Ψ Ω  if 
) (∞ ∈S s . 
A social choice function  F f ∈  is said to be implemented in iterative dominance in 
the Bayesian game  ) , , , , ( u p G Ψ Ω  if there exists the unique iteratively undominated 
strategy profile s, and this profile satisfies that for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
    ) ( )) ( ( ω ω f s x = , 
and 
0 )) ( ( = ω s xi  for all  N i∈ . 
We must note that whenever f  is implemented in iterative dominance in  ) , , , , ( u p G Ψ Ω , 











i A A . 
We denote  A a a N i i ∈ = ∈ ) ( , where  i a  implies the  th i −  characteristic of the alternative a. 
We assume that each agent i , by observing her private signal  i ω , can know the  th i −  
characteristic of the socially desirable alternative  ) (ω f . These assumptions imply that the 
social choice function  f  is decomposable in the sense that there exists  N i i f ∈ ) (  such that 
i i i A f → Ω :  for all  N i∈ , 
and 
    N i i i f f ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω ω  for all  Ω ∈ ω , 
where  ) ( i i f ω  is regarded as the  th i −  characteristic of the socially desirable alternative 
) (ω f  at state  Ω ∈ ω , which depends only on agent  s i'  private signal  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
We assume that there exists a positive integer  0 > K  such that 
  
K
i i A M =  for all  N i∈ , 
where K  is sufficiently large. Each agent  N i∈  makes K  announcements at once about 
what the  th i −   characteristic of the socially desirable alternative is. Let 
K i i i M M M , 1 , × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × =  where  i k i A M = , . We denote 
K
k k i i s s 1 , ) ( = =  where   19
k i i k i M s , , : → Ω  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k∈ . 
Let  i i S s ∈ ˆ  denote the honest strategy for agent i such that 
) ( ) ( ˆ , i i i k i f s ω ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Let  S s s N i i ∈ = ∈ ) ˆ ( ˆ  denote the honest strategy profile. 
Fix a positive real number  0 > d  arbitrarily, which is sufficiently large. We assume 
that each agent  s i'  utility function  i u  satisfies that there exist a function  R A vi → Ω × : 
and a positive real number  0 > i c  such that 
i
i i k i
i i i i i c
K
f m K k
t a v m t a u
)} ( : } ,..., 1 { { #




− + = , 
and 
    d a v a v i i
N A i a a
≤ ′ −
× Ω × ∈ ′
) , ( ) , ( max




We assume that the upper bound of monetary fines  0 > ε  is smaller than  i c , i.e., 
(4)     i c < ε  for all  N i∈ . 
Based on inequalities (4), we can assume that the number of announcements K  is so large 
that there exists a positive integer  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K  such that 
(5)     ε > i c
K
K ˆ
 for all  N i∈ , 
and 
(6)     d K K > − ε ) ˆ (.  
These inequalities imply that the mechanism depends on, not only the upper bound d  of 
utility differences for consequences, but also agents’ psychological costs  N i i c ∈ ) ( . We, 




4.3. Mechanism Design 
 
 
We design a mechanism  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ t x G =  as follows. For every  M m∈  and every  A a∈ , 
K K
a m K K k
a m x
N i k i
ˆ
} ) ( : } ,..., 1 ˆ { { #










, the central planner will pick 
up the profile of agents’  th k −  announcements  A m N i k i ∈ ∈ ) ( , , and will choose it. Note that 
) ( ˆ m x  does not depend on agents’ first K ˆ  announcements  ) ,..., (
ˆ 1 K m m . 
For every  N i∈  and every  M m∈ ,   20
ε − = ) ( ˆ m ti  if there exist  } ,..., 2 { K k ∈  such that  1 , , i k i m m ≠ , and 
N j j N j k j m m ∈ ∈ = ) ( ) ( 1 , ,  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h . 
and 
0 ) ( ˆ = m ti  if there exists no such k . 
Hence, each agent  N i∈  is fined if and only if she is the first agent whose announcement is 
inconsistent with her first announcement. 
  We must note that the mechanism G ˆ  is  different from the mechanism 
* G  in  a 
substantial way. In 
* G  any agent other than agent 1 is fined if she firstly deviates from 
agent 1’s first announcement, whereas in G ˆ  any agent is fined if she firstly deviates from 
her own first announcement. This difference is inevitable, because agents have different 
partial information about the true socially desirable alternative. This will cause another 
difference between 
* G  and  G ˆ  such  that  in 
* G   only the first announcement profile is 
irrelevant to the alternative choice, whereas in G ˆ   we need the first K ˆ  multiple 
announcement profiles to be irrelevant. 
 
 
4.4. Possibility Theorem 
 
 
  We will show that the mechanism G ˆ  implements in iterative dominance any social 
choice function that satisfies a variant of incentive compatibility given by inequalities (7) 
below, as long as the agents regard its value at any state as being socially desirable. 
 
Theorem 2:  A social choice function f   is implemented in iterative dominance in 
) , , , , ˆ ( u p G Ψ Ω  if for every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  )} ( /{ i i i i f A a ω ∈ , 
(7)     i i i i i i i i c
K
K K
p f a v E p f v E
) ˆ (
] , | ) )), ( , (( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [
−
− > − − ω ω ω ω ω ω . 
 
Proof: Whenever agents announce according to the honest strategy profile s ˆ, then at any 
state  Ω ∈ ω  the central planner will choose the social desirable alternative  ) (ω f , and no 
agents will be fined, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
1 )) ( ))( ( ˆ ( ˆ = ω ω f s x , 
and 
0 )) ( ˆ ( ˆ = ω s ti  for all  N i∈ . 
Hence, all we have to do in this proof is to show that s ˆ   is the unique iteratively 
undominated strategy profile. 
Fix  S s∈  and  N i∈  arbitrarily. Fix  Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily. Suppose 
) ( ) ( , , j k j j k j s s ω ω ≠  for some  } /{i N j∈  and some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ .   21
Then, agent i is never fined whenever she announces 
) ( , i i k i f m ω =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 
Next, suppose 
) ( ) ( 1 , , j k j j k j s s ω ω − =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈  and all  N j∈ . 
If 
) ( ) ( , i i i k i f s ω ω ≠  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , 




 of psychological cost. This amount is greater than the monetary fine ε  because of 
inequality (5). If 
) ( ) ( 1 , , i k i i k i s s ω ω − ≠  for some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ , 
then the central planner will fine agent i. Since she has non-consequential moral preference 
and her first K ˆ  announcements do not influence the central planner’s alternative choice, it 
follows from the above arguments that agent i   is willing to replace the first K ˆ  
announcements 
K
k i k i s
ˆ
1 , )) ( ( = ω  with 
K
k i k i s
ˆ
1 , )) ( ˆ ( = ω . Hence, we have proved that for every  N i∈ , 
if  i s  is iteratively undominated, then it must hold that 
k i k i s s , , ˆ =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 
 Fix  } ,..., 1 ˆ { K K k + ∈  arbitrarily. Suppose that 
k j k j s s , , ˆ =  for all  N j∈  and all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k k . 
Fix  i i Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily, and suppose 
) ( ) ( , i i i k i f s ω ω ≠ . 
Let  i i M m ∈  denote the message for agent i defined by 
    ) ( ˆ , i k i
k
i s m ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { k k ∈ , 
and 
) ( , i k i
k
i s m ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k k + ∈ . 
Suppose 
) ( ) ( , j i j k j f s ω ω ≠  for some  } /{i N j∈ . 
Then, 
    ε ω − = )) ( ( ˆ s ti , 
and 
0 )) ( , ( ˆ = − − i i i i s m t ω . 
Inequality (6) implies that the expected value of agent  s i'  utility  differences  for 
consequences between the messages  ) ( i i s ω  and  i m  is less than ε . Hence, agent i prefers 
announcing  i m  instead of  ) ( i i s ω .   22
Next, suppose 
) ( ) ( , j i j k j f s ω ω ≠  for all  } /{i N j∈ . 
Then, 
ε ω − = )) ( ( ˆ s ti , 
and 
ε ω − ≥ − − )) ( , ( ˆ
i i i i s m t . 
Inequality (7), together with non-consequential moral preference, implies that agent i has 
strict incentive to make the honest announcement whenever the other agents make the 
honest announcements. Hence, agent i prefers to announce  i m  instead of  ) ( i i s ω . 
From the above arguments, we have proved that if s  is an iteratively undominated 
strategy profile, then  s s ˆ =  must hold. Since the set of iteratively undominated strategy 
profiles 
∞ S  is nonempty, we have completed the proof of Theorem 2. 
Q.E.D. 
 
We can say that the mechanism G ˆ  is detail-free, because it is independent of the set of 
states Ω , the probability function p , agents’ preferences for consequences  N i i v ∈ ) (,  a n d  
even the social choice function f . In contrast with the mechanism 
* G , however, the 
construction of the mechanism G ˆ  is not independent of agents’ psychological costs  N i i c ∈ ) ( , 
because of inequalities (5). 
Moreover, in contrast with the mechanism 
* G , the construction of the mechanism G ˆ  
is not independent of the set of alternatives. Note that the sufficient condition (7) depend on 
how the set of possible  th i −  characteristics  i A  to be specified for each  N i∈ . Suppose 
that the central planner knows the range of the social choice function  f , i.e., 
} ) ( : { ) ( Ω ∈ = ∈ = Ω ω ω some for f a A a f . 
Then, she can modify the construction of the mechanism G ˆ  by replacing  A with  ) (Ω f . In 
this case, the sufficient condition (7) will be replaced with the following weaker condition. 
That is, for every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(8)     i i i i i i i c
K
K K
p f v E p f v E
) ˆ (
] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [
−
− ′ > − ω ω ω ω ω ω ω . 
Note that if agents’ psychological costs are very small, then inequalities (8) will be 
approximated by the standard condition of incentive compatibility such that for every 
N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(9)     ] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [ i i i i i i p f v E p f v E ω ω ω ω ω ω ω − ′ ≥ . 




  This section has focused on social choice functions that are decomposable in the sense 
of Subsection 4.2. This subsection will drop all assumptions in Subsection 4.2. We, instead, 
will assume that the central planner knows the set of states Ω   and the social choice 
function  f  in advance, and consider the very general class of social choice functions that 
are not necessarily decomposable. 
  We assume that there exists a positive integer  0 > K  such that 
  
K
i i M Ω =  for all  N i∈ , 
where K  is sufficiently large. Each agent  N i∈  makes K  announcements at once about 
which private signal she receives among  i Ω . We redefine the honest strategy  i i S s ∈ ~  for 
agent i by 
i i k i s ω ω = ) ( ~
,  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Fix a positive real number  0 > d  arbitrarily, which is sufficiently large. We assume 
that each agent  s i'  utility function  i u  satisfies that there exist a function  R A vi → Ω × : 
and a positive real number  0 > i c  such that 
i
i k i
i i i i i c
K
m K k
t a v m t a u
} : } ,..., 1 { { #




− + = , 
and 
    d a v a v i i
N A i a a
≤ ′ −
× Ω × ∈ ′
) , ( ) , ( max




Hence, each agent has positive psychological cost for not honestly announcing her true 
private signal. We assume that inequalities (4), (5), and (6) hold for some  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K . 
We design a mechanism  ) ~ , ~ ( ~ t x G =   in the same way as G ˆ . For every  M m∈  and 
every  A a∈ , 
K K
a m K K k
a m x
N i k i
ˆ
} ) ( : } ,..., 1 ˆ { { #






For every  N i∈  and every  M m∈ , 
ε − = ) ( ˆ m ti  if there exist  } ,..., 2 { K k ∈  such that  1 , , i k i m m ≠ , and 
N j j N j k j m m ∈ ∈ = ) ( ) ( 1 , ,  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h . 
and 
0 ) ( ˆ = m ti  if there exists no such k . 
  Note that the mechanism G
~
 depends on the set of states Ω  and the social choice 
function  f . In spite of this, we would like to regard  G
~
 as being detail-free, because it is 
independent of the probability function  p  and agents’ preferences for consequences  N i i v ∈ ) ( . 
In the same way as in Theorem 2, we can prove that a social choice function f , 
irrespective of whether it is decomposable or not, is implemented in iterative dominance in   24
) , , , ,
~
( u p G Ψ Ω  if inequalities (8) hold. Note that if agents’ psychological costs are very 
small, then inequalities (8) will be approximated by the standard condition of incentive 
compatibility, i.e., inequalities (9). In the standard model of implementation, incentive 
compatibility given by inequalities (9) is not sufficient for implementation in Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium, even if we use mechanisms that are not detail-free.
8  In fact, in the 
standard model, we need additional conditions that require the dependence of agents’ 
preferences for consequences on the state and correlation among their private signals. See 
Jackson (1991), Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), Matsushima (1993), Duggan (1997), 
Serrano and Vohra (2000), and others. In contrast to the standard model, incentive 
compatibility is sufficient in the model of this subsection even if we use only detail-free 
mechanisms. 
We can not see it appropriate in general to assume that any factor of the state relevant 
to the social choice function invariably includes information about either agents’ 
preferences for consequences or the degree to which their private signals are correlated. 
Hence, we must admit that these additional conditions in the standard model are very 
restrictive, even if we can see them as being generic in the spaces of utility functions and 
probability distributions. For related arguments, see Neeman (2004), for instance. 
 
                                                 
8 Bergemann and Morris (2003) and Matsushima and Ohashi (2004) investigated implementation in ex 
post equilibrium. These works used the mechanisms that do not depend on the probability function, but 
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